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C OURTS AND LEGISLATURES of the United States generally view
communications between husband and wife as privileged
against court-room disclosure. The protection which the courts,
legislatures and text writers' have favored seems to stem from
the basic premise "that the privilege against court-room dis-
closure is needed for the encouragement of marital confidences,
which confidences in turn promote harmony between husband
and wife." 2 Affection and understanding between husband and
wife seem far more important for marital harmony than confi-
dence based on a legal rule of evidence.3
The Common Law
Conflicts of views about the evolution of this privilege appear
in the conclusions in many American cases.4 However, the English
Court of Appeals 5 denied that any such privilege existed at com-
mon law. Whatever the historical fact may be, the privilege cer-
tainly is part of the Anglo-American law of evidence today. ,
The writings of Greenleaf and Best influenced the adoption
of the English Evidence Amendments Act of 1853, which provided
that:
No husband shall be compellable to disclose any com-
munications made to him by his wife during the mar-
*B.A., Hiram College; third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § § 2332-2341 (3rd. ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence,
§ 82 (1st. ed. 1954); 5 Jones, Evidence, § § 2128-2153 (2nd. ed. 1926). Also
see 97 C. J. S., Witnesses, § § 75-104, and 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, § § 375-400.
2 McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at 179.
3 Ibid.
4 Arizona Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Wagner, 75 Ariz. 82, 251 P. 2d
897 (1952).
5 Shenton v. Tyler, L. R. 1939 Ch. D. 620. In this decision Sir Wilfrid Greene,
M. R., wrote: "The authorities and textbooks which I have examined in the
course of this judgment are all earlier in date than the Act of 1853. I
must confess to feeling some surprise at the result of that examination;
since the existence of the alleged rule of common law has, I think, in mod-
ern times been assumed by many lawyers. It is not without significance
that the only English text-book earlier in date than the Act of 1853 in
which the existence of the alleged rule is asserted is the First Edition of
Best on Evidence, . . . , where the only authority cited is the American
work of Professor Greenleaf."
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riage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose any
communications made to her by her husband during
the marriage.6
Following this, the legislatures of various states of the United
States began to enact statutes of their own, patterned on this
English statute. Today most of the states have such statutes.
Although they vary greatly in verbiage, the basic idea is well
illustrated by the Pennsylvania Statute:
Nor shall either husband or wife be competent or per-
mitted to testify to confidential communications made
by one to the other unless this privilege be waived
upon trial.7
Communications and Acts
Perhaps the chief uncertainty in the statutory law lies in
whether a "communication" includes both oral and written
communications and also acts, facts, conditions, and transactions
which ordinarily are not thought of as "communications." Some
text writers8 argue that such doubtful acts or omissions should
not be included. "It seems ... that logic and policy should cause
the courts to halt with communications as the furthest boundary
of the privilege." 9 This view was adopted in a prosecution for
transporting a wife in interstate commerce for the purpose of
prostitution, the act of the husband in taking money from his
wife for these "services" being held not to be privileged. 10
However, most of the cases in the United States hold that
"communications" means more than mere words (oral, written
or in sign language) and also includes acts, facts, conditions and
6 Evidence Amendment Act, 1853, St. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, § 3; also known
as "Lord Brougham's Act."
7 Purdon's Penna. Statutes, title 28, § 316. Also see Burns' Indiana Statutes,
1946 Repl., § 2-1714 which reads, "The following persons shall not be com-
petent witnesses: . .. Sixth. Husband and Wife, as to communications made
to each other." Cf. New York, Civil Practice Act, § 349, "a husband or wife
shall not be compelled, or without the consent of the other if living, allowed
to disclose a confidential communication made by one to the other during
marriage. In action for criminal conversation, the plaintiff's wife is not a
competent witness for the plaintiff, but she is a competent witness for the
defendant, as to any matter in controversy; except that she cannot, without
the plaintiff's consent, disclose any confidential communication had or made
between herself and the plaintiff."
8 McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at § 83.
9 Id., at 170.
10 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1943).
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transactions done in coverture." A recent Virginia case 12 viewed
as privileged the acts of a husband in leaving home for a robbery,
his later return, the placing of a pistol on the mantel, and the
wife's subsequent drive with her husband near where a stolen
safe had been hidden.
Time of Making Communication
If the courts' purpose is to protect the marital relationship,
it is only natural for them to limit the use of the privilege to
people actually joined in wedlock. 13 Accordingly, where a man
and woman agree to become husband and wife by common law
marriage, that agreement is not a confidential communication
as between a husband and wife. 14
Divorced couples who disclose information to one another,
after divorce, cannot take advantage of the privilege. 15 Likewise,
a husband's letter to his wife while they are living apart, on being
informed that she was about to sue for divorce, stating that he
would do his utmost to "beat her out of every dollar" should she
begin the litigation, is not a confidential communication. 16
Confidential
One of the important elements of the privilege is that the
communication be of a confidential nature. If the communication
was not so intended, the privilege is lost.' 7 A husband's note
left for his wife at their home, written on a large piece of card-
board, was not intended to be confidential.' 8 In a case where a
husband, under the observing eye of his wife, pushed a wheel-
barrow with a trunk on it and dumped something out of the
trunk into an outhouse vault, the decision allowed admission of
the wife's testimony over objection, because these acts were not
intended to be confidential. 19
Business transactions constitute an exception to the rule
of confidential communications. The reasoning of the courts in
denying business use of the privilege is that, even though the
11 Smith v. State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803 (1926).
12 Menefee v. Comm., 189 Va. 900, 55 S.E. 2d 9 (1949).
13 58 Am. Jur. § 378; 70 C. J. Witnesses, § 510.
14 Forshay v. Johnston, 144 Neb. 525, 13 N.W. 2d 873 (1944).
15 Cain v. Enyon, 331 Mich. 81, 49 N. W. 2d 72 (1951).
16 McNamara v. McNamara, 99 Neb. 9, 154 N.W. 858 (1915).
17 People v. Palumbo, 5 Ill. 2d 409, 125 N.E. 2d 518 (1955).
18 Yoder v. United States, 80 F. 2d 665 (4th Cir. 1935).
19 Smith v. State, supra n. 11.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1959
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
communication occurs in the confidence afforded by the marital
relationship, actually they intend that sooner or later their
conversations (decisions) shall become known to the public.
20
The privilege is also barred by the presence of third persons
during the "confidential" disclosure.21 Thus, a letter dictated to
a stenographer by a prisoner, which letter is later received by
the prisoner's wife, is not privileged.
22
Children present another problem. The child may be enough
of an intruder in the element of confidence to bar it.23 However,
this is not always true. The essential question in such a situation
is not the mere presence of a child, but the degree of understand-
ing the child has, or the age of the child, which may or may not
indicate its mental capacity. 24
Eavesdropper Rule
The privilege does not prevent disclosure by a third person,
who either by accident or design overheard the conversation,
even though the privilege would exist between the husband and
wife.
2 5
An enterprising father and son team developed one of the
most unique schemes found in the American cases in an attempt
to qualify under this exception. The son, with the permission
of the father but with no knowledge on the part of the mother,
set up a tape-recording device with a microphone attached to his
parents' bed. Upon their retiring a tape recording was made of
the "confidential" communications which took place between the
husband and wife. The court, disturbed by such a practice, would
not allow the tape recording to be introduced into evidence. Be-
trayal of the marital confidence, whether in court or by such sly
devices out of court, will not be tolerated.26
20 Brooks v. Brooks, 357 Mo. 343, 208 S.W. 2d 279 (1948).
21 Tabbah v. United States, 217 F. 2d 528 (5th Cir. 1954).
22 Wolfe v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, 78 L. Ed. 617 (1934). Justice Stone
in his opinion wrote: "the privilege suppresses relevant testimony, and
should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence cannot other-
wise reasonably be preserved."
23 Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W. Va. 309, 130 S. E. 270 (1925).
24 Ibid.
25 Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 P. 2d 1018 (1947). Also see
Nash v. Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 672, 146 S. E. 726 (1929).
Justice Lively wrote: "for, even though a conversation between husband
and wife was intended to be confidential, a third person who overheard it,
whether his presence was known or not, may testify as to what was said."
26 Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 401 (1951).
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Family Wrongs
Courts usually hold that actions by one spouse against the
other constitute an exception to the privilege, and allow com-
munications to be admitted.27 For instance, in a divorce case the
husband's statements about his own infidelity were admitted.
No consideration of domestic peace and harmony or of
the sanctity of the marital relation forbid their disclosure
to redress the wrongs of the injured party. They did
not arise from the confidence existing between the
parties, but from the want of it.
28
The most commonly recognized exceptions to the rule of
privilege are:
(a) In an action by one spouse against the other;
(b) In an action for damages for the alienation of affec-
tions;
(c) In a criminal action in which one spouse is accused
of crimes against the other or against the children.
29
Death and Divorce
At common law husband and wife were incompetent to
testify for or against one another, and they were also
incompetent to testify either during the marriage re-
lation or after its termination by death...30
As is suggested by this quotation, the law protects the privi-
ledged communications not only during the lifetime of either
party, but also after death. Likewise, divorce will not permit
the disclosure of the communication. 31
Who is the Holder of the Privilege?
The problem of who holds the privilege to disclose or to
require disclosure of a confidential communication has long
troubled the courts.32 The problem is not the same as that in the
27 As to statutes which so hold see, 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 488 (3rd ed.
1940).
28 Seitz v. Seitz, 170 Pa. 71, 32 A. 578 (1895).
29 Uniform Rules of Evidence, R. 28 (2).
30 Ohio Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 461, 127 N. E. 743 (1920).
31 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2341 op. cit. supra, n. 27. Also, Cain v. Enyon,
supra, n. 15.
32 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, n. 27, at § 2340.
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attorney-client privilege3 3 or the doctor-patient privilege. 34 In
both of these latter privileges, it is universally agreed that the
client and the patient, respectively, are the holders of the privi-
lege, and that they may waive it at their own discretion if they
wish.35 However, as to the husband-wife privilege, the courts,
in some situations, are in hopeless conflict over which one may
qualify as a holder of the right.36
Wigmore suggests that the holder should be the communi-
cating spouse and that in the case of a unilateral oral statement
the maker of the statement would be the only party capable of
requiring its publication. But if the case involves the receiving
parties unspoken adoption of the statement, then both sender and
receiver would be entitled to claim the privilege.
3 7
McCormick points out that the problem actually stems from
the assumption that the words "competency" and "privilege" are
synonymous,38 which of course is not true. Most statutes have
been construed to mean that the parties are merely "competent"
to testify to confidential marital communication,3 9 and now allow
either party to the action to claim the benefit of the rule. 40 Cor-
rectly speaking, this is purely a "privilege," and not a problem of
competency. Viewed as "privilege," only the holder of the
privilege can claim it. 41 Yet a waiver may be effected by failure
of either party to the communication to object.42
The Ohio Statute
Ohio Revised Code § 2317.0243 provides for the husband and
wife privilege in Ohio. Its unique aspect, found in the statutes
33 Id., at § § 2327-2329.
34 Id., at § 2386. Also see, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 104 Colo.
13, 87 P. 2d 758 (1939). In this case the physician was required to testify
where the privilege had been waived by the patient.
35 Ibid.
36 McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at § 87.
37 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, n. 27, at 2340.
See Fraser v. United States, 145 F. 2d 139 (6th Cir., 1944).
38 McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 36.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Patterson v. Skoglund, 181 Ore. 167, 180 P. 2d 108 (1947). Only the hus-
band and wife are the holders of the privilege, not the defendant; and the
defendant cannot invoke the privilege.
43 Formerly G. C. § 11494.
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of few other states,4 4 is that both a "communication made by one
to the other, or an act done by either in the presence of the
other .. " 45 is privileged. This differs from statutes of most other
states, which usually only include "communication" as subject to
the privilege,46 leaving to the courts the determination of whether
or not physical acts should be viewed as communications.4
7
Conclusion
The history of the development of the husband-wife privilege
is of little importance, now that the privilege is so well recog-
nized. The primary concern of courts and lawyers now is the
application of the various privilege statutes. Conflicting views
regarding "communications" or "acts," the time of the making
of the communication, the aspect of "confidence," the eavesdrop-
per rule, and waiver, are making a legal puzzle out of what was
once considered to be a fundamental and simple concept of
jurisprudence.
44 See Sub-title, Communications and Acts, in this article.
45 0. R. C. § 2317.02.
46 Pennsylvania Statute, supra, n. 7.
47 McCormick, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at § 83. The complete Ohio Statute per-
taining to husband and wife privilege, 0. R. C. § 2317.02 (G. C. 11494) reads:
"The following persons shall not testify in certain respects . . . (c) Husband
or Wife, concerning any communication made by one to the other, or an
act done by either in the presence of the other, during coverture, unless the
communication was made, or act done, in the known presence or hearing
of a third person competent to be a witness; and such rule is the same if
the marital relation has ceased to exist; . . ." Also see, Page's Ohio Digest,
Witnesses, § 106, and Ohio Jur., Witnesses, § 238.
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